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Book Reviews
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

By Michael J. Perry. Yale University Press. 1982
REVIEWED BY WILLIAM

L.

REYNOLDS*

Constitutional law over the past half century1 has shown a remarkable capacity for growth. During that span the power of Congress to regulate social and economic matters has become virtually
absolute; the protections of the Bill of Rights have been accorded
citizens against actions by state governments; the Civil War amendments have secured legal equality for blacks, women, and members
of other minority groups; and a whole new batch of personal
"rights" has been defined by the Court.2 Such dramatic changes
necessarily and properly have led to questions concerning the legitimacy of those actions.
Much of the inquiry has centered on the relation between constitutional text and Supreme Court decisionmaking. Although that
relation has long been a source of discussion,' it had generated relatively little controversy because of the widespread assumption that
constitutional interpretation was necessarily text-bound. Judges, it
was assumed, were bound to determine the meaning of the constitutional language and use that determination to resolve the case at
bar. The divergence between theory and practice in this area that
many believe has taken place in recent years has been masked by the
Court's overt reliance on text, history, and precedent as the proper
decisional basis, and by the general popularity in the scholarly com* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D.
1970, Harvard University.
1. The change can be traced to the decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), when Justice Roberts joined the majority in the famous "switch in time
that saved nine."
2. Indeed, even more sweeping changes seemed at times to be waiting in the wings
for their moment on stage. Perhaps the most prominent of these was the expectation
created by cases such as Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), that the Court would afford the poor some
protection against the hazards of their poverty. See generally Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
3. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where Chief
Justice Marshall contrasted our Constitution to a "legal code" and wrote the famous
phrase: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." Id. at 407
(emphasis in original).
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munity of those decisions. Beginning about a decade ago, however,
scholars began to question the textual basis of the Court's efforts;
perhaps the most influential article was a short piece by Professor
Grey whose title captured the problem: Do We Have an Unwritten
4
Grey argued that many of the landmark opinions of
Constitution?
the Warren and Burger courts could not be squared with any acceptable form of textual analysis. 5 Grey's analysis of those decisions
has been widely accepted.
Having revealed the naked state of the Emperor, scholars then
began to examine what role, if any, textual analysis should play in
constitutional jurisprudence. The debaters, after some initial struggling, settled into two major camps-known generally as the interpretivists and the non-interpretivists.
The former group, whose patron saint is Justice Black, 6 is
headed by Robert Bork" and Raoul Berger.8 They believe in the
primacy of the constitutional text (as well as the "intent" of its
Framers), that is, in an historical approach to constitutional adjudication. The Court must interpret the sacred writing, but it cannot
stray beyond that limited task. Cases that cannot be justified on a
textual basis (or perhaps by precedent) lack legitimacy.
The non-interpretivists raise a number of objections to the argument that judicial interpretation should be text-bound. Thus, it
has been asked why the language adopted so long ago should be
accorded primacy today, why it should bind a nation that did not
participate in its adoption.9 Others have rejected the interpretivist
position because it can be manipulated too easily;' 0 the evidence
4. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
5. See id. at 707 for Grey's examples of such cases. They include Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). Ironically enough, Grey wrote to defend those decisions-but on a
different basis than the text of the Constitution.
6. It is certainly difficult, however, to square Black the interpretivist with Black the
creator of the theory that the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. That theory, of course, defies interpretivist justification.
7. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1
(1971).
8. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 409 (1977) ("I cannot bring myself to believe that the Court may assume a power not granted in order to correct an end
that the people were, and remain, unready to cure"); Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an
ImperialJudiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981).
9. E.g., C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 203 (1947).
10. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786-804 (1983) (interpretive theory is "conceptually
incapable of providing the constraints on judicial tyranny that its advocates claim it
offers").
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available as to the Framers' intent is so ambiguous that a smart lawyer should be able to advance a text-based argument to support any
position. Suitable responses can be made to these concerns,'" and
it is clear that these are not the primary concern of the non-interpretivists. Instead, most seem to reject textual analysis because they do
not like the results reached by that method. The challenge for the
non-interpretivists, then, is to find (and justify) a decision-making
method which reaches the "right" results. This line of inquiry has
led to some pretty weird answers.' 2 Thus, we have Paul Brest willing to accord the text of the Constitution only presumptive validity,
a presumption that may be rebutted in the light of current values'3 _whatever they may be.' 4 Richard Parker would fashion a
constitutional law for the "generation of the 1960's," one which
would respond to the routine "political ineffectiveness and quies11. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, should provide a satisfactory
answer to the primacy problem (although perhaps not to the question of which branch
of government gets the final say-e.g., whether judicial review is proper). The text may
have been adopted two centuries ago, but those who choose to live in America today
accept the Constitution as supreme law. This argument, unabashedly contractarian, is
based on a belief that those who choose to live in a society that permits emigration freely
have agreed to abide by the rules of that society. The validity of the interpretivist position can also be asserted on structural grounds: The constitutional scheme of separation of powers rests in large measure on the desire to balance the relative strength of the
three branches of government. A Supreme Court free to disregard the language, history, and structure of the Constitution is free to arrogate too much power to itselfthereby upsetting the balance of power.
As to the smart lawyer argument, the fact that arguments can be made does not
mean, of course, that they are correct, although given the quality of much of the recent
work of the Court, one might be excused for thinking otherwise. One of the fallacies of
the smart lawyer argument is quickly exposed if it be borne in mind that the burden of
proof as to the validity of a proffered interpretation should be allocated to the party
seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality. See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209,

230-31 (1983).
12. Some of these theories are discussed in Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong
Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship andJudicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207,
1233-38 (1984); Grano,JudicialReview and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1,29-50 (1981).
13. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204,

228-29 (1980).
14. Curiously, those who advocate the use of contemporary values often suggest results that seem to be congruent with their own beliefs. Contemporary values, so defined, appear to be congruent with normal academic, mildly liberal, mildly libertarian
points of view. One wonders if Paul Brest's own beliefs are really shared by a majority of
Americans. The example of popular response to the death penalty abolition is instructive. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (in three years following
Furman, 35 state legislatures enacted new death penalty statutes, one statewide referendum negated a similar state supreme court ruling, and jurors sentenced more than 460
persons to death).
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cence" of ordinary citizens. 5 And Mark Tushnet, in a much quoted
phrase, has stated that his criterion for a proper decision is purely
political: A decision is correct if the result is "likely to advance the
cause of socialism."16
Those theories may be unusual,' 7 but they highlight the real
problems of non-interpretivism: legitimacy and control. If theJus8
tices are freed from the discipline imposed by textual analysis,'
then it is difficult to argue that Tushnet's standard is wrong (as opposed to misguided), for the rejection of the text eliminates the
usual method of controlling the Court. Many non-interpretivists
have sought to devise methods to insure that the exercise ofjudicial
power can be controlled and, therefore, made legitimate. Expressed somewhat differently, a Justice exercising interpretive review legitimates her actions by referring to the text (and history) of
the Constitution; that reference also limits her power because she
cannot act-on constitutional matters-without textually derived
power.
Such are the issues discussed in Michael Perry's recent book.' 9
Perry, who now teaches at Northwestern, has made a serious effort
to defend "the legitimacy of constitutional policy-making (by the judiciary) that goes beyond the value judgments established by the
framers of the written Constitution" (what he calls "extra-constitutional policy-making").2 His book makes a valiant effort in defense
of that policy making. Perry discusses and criticizes the major attempts to justify non-interpretivist decision making. His analysis of
those methods alone makes the book worth reading. Clearly,
Perry's work is serious and significant, and it has been treated as
such. 2 ' But despite these accomplishments, Perry fails in his major
15. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 223,
257-58 (1981). Parker was a classmate of mine in law school; I can say with assurance
that he does not speak for every academic of his generation.
16. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 411, 424
(1981).
17. These theories are probably less unusual in appearance to academics than they
are to the practicing bar. When I discuss specific non-interpretivist cases with practicing
lawyers, I am often struck by their strong adherence to the text-based methods of interpretation, and by their incredulity that the Court could (and does) use non-interpretive
methods.
18. Of course, the interpretivist test imposes discipline only if the Court takes seriously that task. The evidence that this is always the case is not weighty.
19. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
20. Id. at ix (emphasis in original).
21. See, e.g., Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1984); Kristol, Book
Review, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (1984).
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effort, and this failure reveals much about the difficulty of defending
extra-constitutional policy making.
Perry begins his task by examining the legitimacy ofjudicial review. He states that interpretive review is clearly legitimate: "No
contemporary constitutional theorist seriously disputes the legitimacy of interpretive review.' '22 Here Perry covers well-traveled
ground, and his presentation, although interesting, is familiar
enough, because it is based on the functional argument that judicial
review is the best method of "completing the framers' vision of the
Constitution as supreme law." ' 2 ' Hence, judicial review is necessary
in order to insure that the text of the Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land.
Non-interpretive review is a different matter, however, for in
such cases no Sacred Text informs the Justices of the Framers' vision. 2 4 Instead, non-interpretive review is necessarily a form of policy making, and policy making, to be legitimate, must be traced to a
body accountable to the electorate. Hence, an opinion exercising
non-interpretive review must somehow satisfy the test of electoral
accountability if it is to be legitimate. 25 This linkage between electoral accountability and legitimacy is crucial to Perry's justification of
non-interpretive review.
After stating this essential criterion, Perry then examines the
legitimacy of non-interpretive review in cases involving federalism,
separation of powers, and human rights. He finds that non-interpretive review is not necessary in federalism cases, basing that conclusion on Herbert Wechsler's argument that sufficient political
checks exist to protect states' rights. 26 Those checks, in other
22. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 11. For an argument that the scope of today's judicial
review far exceeds anything contemplated by the Framers, see Strong, Bicentennial
Benchmarks: Two Centuries of Evolution of ConstitutionalProcesses, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1976).

23. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 16. This, of course, is also perhaps the most persuasive of the arguments Chief Justice Marshall advanced to justify judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. Perry rejects the notion that non-interpretive review can be justified in terms of
either the text or the original understanding of the Constitution. Perry considers the
possibility that non-interpretive review might be contrary to the Framers' intent (and,
therefore, illegitimate by definition), but he rejects that argument. M. PERRY, supra note
19, at 20-21. That rejection is necessary because it permits him to support non-interpretive review as extra-constitutional rather than non-constitutional. Even so, some decisions Perry supports could be viewed as denying rights guaranteed by a text-based
reading of the Constitution. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (denying right of association to parents who want their children to go to segregated schools).
25. A "legitimate" opinion must satisfy other standards-such as that of principled
adjudication. See M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 25-28.
26. Id. at 43-45. Perry classifies National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

19851

BOOK REVIEW

209

words, insure that there is no need for the Court to go beyond the
text of the Constitution to protect adequately states' rights. In separation of powers cases, non-interpretive review presents no problem
for Perry because it is not counter-majoritarian and thus does not
conflict with the notion of electoral accountability. The Court in
such cases "necessarily defers to the political judgment of at least
one electorally accountable branch of the national government
....
27 Because the Court in those cases supports the actions of
one of the electorally accountable branches of government, the
Court's non-interpretive review should be of little concern. 2 8
Having deftly disposed of non-interpretivism as a problem in
federalism and separation of powers cases, Perry can turn to "the
heart of the matter," '2 9 the issue that clearly interests him most-the
legitimacy of non-interpretive review in first and fourteenth amendment cases. Perry begins his analysis of this problem by agreeing
with Raoul Berger and other interpretivists that the latter amendment was designed neither to delegate natural law decision-making
capacity to the Court nor to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights. 3"
Hence, "enforcement of the first amendment by the Court against
the state is not interpretive review ... ."" Similarly, human rights
cases like Brown v. Board of Education,3" Perry argues, cannot be justified in terms of the original understanding of those who adopted the
fourteenth amendment.3 3
At this point, Perry is ready to address the tough question of
why decisions like Brown are legitimate exercises of judicial power,
(1976), as an example of non-interpretive review. His position that it was decided
wrongly, id at 48, has been recently affirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 53 U.S.L.W. 4135, 4143 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985)
(overruling Usery).
27. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 59-60. Separation o1 powers cases in which the Court
invalidates a significant action by one branch of government are scarce as hen's teeth.
That helps explain the fame of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), a case which confirms Perry's observation that the Court believes it necessary to
ally itself with another branch of government when striking down legislation in this area.
Of course, in Youngstown the Court had to engage in some pretty dubious statutory construction to conclude that Congress was on the side of the Justices. See id. at 585-86.
28. I wonder what Perry thinks of Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103
S. Ct. 2764 (1983). There, the Court invalidated the longstanding acquiescence by both
Congress and the President in the use of the legislative veto. Chadha, therefore, is a
separation of powers decision with no root in electoral accountability; the Chadhamajority, however, did attempt to justify the decision on interpretivist grounds.
29. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 61.
30. Id. at 61-64.
31. Id. at 63.
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 66-74.
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even though they cannot be justified by an interpretivist analysis.
He begins by suggesting that judicial review in human rights cases
"represents the institutionalization of prophecy." 3 4 Perry uses this
remarkable phrase to capture our national commitment "to the notion of moral evolution," our "ongoing struggle to bring our collective (political) practice into ever closer harmony with our evolving,
deepening moral understanding." 3 5 This argument, which can be
36
traced to the "City on the Hill" view of American development,
reflects a belief in a moral Manifest Destiny. Non-interpretive review in human rights cases represents, therefore, a necessary part of
the struggle to fulfull that Destiny, of the attempt to reach that
"deepening moral understanding." Non-interpretive judicial review
is essential because the judiciary is the only institution in our government that addresses basic moral issues by reflecting on those
problems rather than by referring as a matter of course to the accepted way of doing things. Hence, the justification for such review
is that it permits us to seek and sometimes attain a higher goal in
our journey as a people. Non-interpretive review in human rights
cases, in other words, "enables us to take seriously. . . the possibility that there are right answers to political-moral problems." 3 7
Perry makes an argument that the Court should seek these
"right answers," but he rejects the notion that a particular school of
moral philosophy should be adopted by the Court to generate the
answers.3 8 Instead, each Justice should consult those portions of
ethical literature she believes to be most useful. This process of
consultation in adjudication will lead to an evolution in moral
thought; the judiciary not only looks "backward to the sentiment of
old moralities, but ahead to emergent principles in terms of which
fragments of a new moral order can be forged." 39 Perry describes
the relation between courts and the electorally accountable
branches as "dialectical" and enlists luminaries such as Rostow,
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 99.
36. John Winthrop told his fellow voyagers on the Arabella that, "Wee shall be as a
Citty upon a Hill .....
quoted in D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 3 (1958).
37. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 102. Perry emphasizes that this is a function best
served by the judiciary; judges trained in reflective deliberation and relatively free of
political pressures are the persons in our society best equipped to search out these
answers.
38. Id. at 110. Perry states that his assumption that there are right answers should
not be confused with an assumption that there is one moral system that should be referred to in the process of discovering those answers.

39. Id. at 111.
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Bickel, and Dworkin in support. Bickel wrote, for example, that,
"[v]irtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the
beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and
their representatives. "40 Thus, non-interpretive review serves the
goal of helping us aspire to give right answers to basic politicalmoral problems. And, of course, it has served that task well, for few
of us would argue that-by and large-the Court's answers to group
discrimination, to barbarous forms of criminal procedure, to free
speech issues, are not right in some ultimate moral sense. 4 '
But are those answers legitimate ones for the Court to give?
Given Perry's concern, mentioned earlier, with electoral accountability in policy making, how can non-interpretive review be legitimate in his view? His surprising, indeed bizarre, answer is premised
on the belief that real political control (and hence political accountability) over the Court does exist-in the form of the legislative
power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of all federal courts, including that of the Supreme Court, but only in non-interpretive review
cases.4" Perry is serious about this as the answer to the legitimacy
question; indeed, he responds to those who believe Congress lacks
such power in this fashion:
I must look upon all arguments to the effect that Congress
lacks such a (broad) power as attacks . . . on non-interpretive review. Because ifin fact Congress did lack such a power, I
would not know how to defend non-interpretive review in terms
consistent with the principle of electorally accountable policy-making.4"
Thus, in his zeal to defend non-interpretive review, Perry advances a
justification that itself presents a remarkable number of difficulties.
40. Id. at 113 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
91 (1970)).
41. I was taught Constitutional Law by a former New Dealer who was somewhat bemused by the favorable attitude towards judicial activism among his liberal students. He
emphasized that the Court in the not too distant past had been on the other side of the
political fence. Although Perry acknowledges that cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) represent
the possibility of "judicial misadventure," he sidesteps the issue of whether these cases,
embodying views commonly held at the time, weaken his moral argument for non-interpretive review. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 125.
42. Perry also notes that there are "practicallimits to what a judge should say is constitutionally required or forbidden, his own values notwithstanding." M. PERRY, supra
note 19, at 123 (emphasis in original). His examples-of a judge who believes "that
porpoises are so intelligent they should be treated as persons or that all imprisonment is
terribly immoral"--hardly suggest any "practical" limits. Nor does Perry explain how
the "practical" limits will operate in practice.
43. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
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First, it can hardly be said that a consensus exists concerning
the constitutionality of significant congressional limitations on judicial review. I will not here review those arguments, except to note
that a number of eminent authorities disagree with Perry.4 4 He
would counter partially by observing that his system would permit
Congress to eliminate jurisdiction only in non-interpretive review
cases. That is not an effective response because he must then assert
that the line between the two classes ofjudicial review is not hard to
draw. He dispenses with the problem of line drawing by observing
that "in very few consequential human rights cases of the modern
era can the Court's decisions even plausibly be explained as products
of interpretive review"! 5 Presumably (and remarkably), then, Congress is free to eliminate federal jurisdiction in most human rights
cases.
Even if we overlook the dubious constitutionality of Perry's argument and we grant the validity of his proposition, the distinction
he draws between the two kinds ofjudicial review is unworkable and
has the potential for creating a great deal of mischief. The Court,
after all, always (or almost always) pays lip service, at a minimum, to
the notion that it is not free to engage in non-interpretive review.
Who then gets the final say on whether a decision is "interpretive"
and, therefore, not subject to congressional tinkering? If the Court
does, then there is no restraint, for it can label all decisions as interpretive; if the Congress gets the final say, then what is to stop it from
throwing the baby (interpretive review) out with the bath-water?
Among its many other virtues, Marbury v. Madison 6 placed the issue
of finality in the Court's hands. That settlement, which has proven
eminently workable and popular, would be endangered by adoption
of the Perry analysis.
It might also be asked why, if Congress has the power ascribed
to it by Perry, it has not chosen to exercise it. Certainly, many decisions over the past few decades have been exceedingly unpopular.
Yet there have been few serious attempts to meddle with the jurisdictional basis of those decisions. Perry attempts to buttress his argument by noting that many members of Congress undoubtedly
44. E.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17
(1981); see also Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction,
1865-1873, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 131, 154-63 (1984).
45. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 130 (emphasis in original).
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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agree with the Court's human rights decisions, but for various tactical reasons are unwilling to say so publicly.4 7 This argument merely
obscures the basic issue. A form of congressional control over the
Court that has almost never been used can hardly be said to serve as
an adequate method of legitimating the Court's actions. Like the
forlorn hope of the constitutional amendment to rectify judicial error, statutory exercise of jurisdictional control seems unlikely to
happen. If there is to be no such control, it is very difficult to understand how the possibility that it may happen-even if it were constitutional-can be used to legitimate the decisions of the Court.4 8
Another problem with Perry's suggested justification is that it
does not deal with the problems created by stare decisis. Assume
Congress withdrew jurisdiction of all federal courts in, say, abortion
cases, and that a state legislature then forbade all abortions. When
the state law is challenged in state court, does (must? should?) that
tribunal follow Roe v. Wade? That decision, after all, has not been
overruled, and, therefore, it must still be the law of the land. To be
sure, the state court can refuse to follow Roe without fear of reversal,
but state judges might also feel bound by the oath they have taken
pursuant to the supremacy clause. 49 The same argument can be
made if Congress were to limit Roe-the supremacy clause applies to
Congress as well as to the state legislature. The sanction ofjurisdiction, in other words, may be a hoax, because it does not deal effectively with the problem offinality.
It is well and good to say that the Congress can withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts; that does not address the question
of how one goes about reversing-except by the arduous process of
constitutional amendment-a decision that Congress does not like
that was based upon non-interpretivist analysis.50 For that reason, I
believe that no analysis of decision-making methodologies that are
not based on the text can be styled adequate, if the analysis does not
take into account the issue of finality in constitutional decision-

47. M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 134.
48. Indeed, it could easily be argued that Congress has not tampered with the
Court's jurisdiction because it believes that doing so would be an even greater threat to
the governmental structure we have built over the centuries than is posed by the occasional "wrong" decision in the area of human rights. Congress, in other words, may be
reluctant to tinker with jurisdiction, even when it finds a particular decision repulsive,
because doing so would upset our delicate governmental balance.
49. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
50. Assuming, of course, that Congress knows that a particular decision is non-interpretivist and, therefore, subject to jurisdictional limitations.
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making. 51
Even if Perry's justification for non-interpretivist judicial review
is not so seriously flawed, other significant objections-some of
which I have noted elsewhere in this Review-could be raised. I
should mention briefly, however, the "straw man" arguments of
Perry and his ilk concerning the evils of interpretivism: Often proponents of theories defending non-interpretivist review are in too
great a hurry to show the evils that flow from a text-based method of
interpretation. After all there would be nothing to write about if all
"correct" decisions could be reached from an interpretivist's point
of view. This is not to say that all human rights decisions can be
based upon a proper reading of the Constitution. Those who wish
to set up a method of interpretation that extends beyond the text,
however, should think carefully about how textual analysis is best
undertaken. Far too often, non-interpretivists seem to take a very
narrow, crabbed, almost literal, approach to questions of interpretation. Thus, Perry's position on Brown v. Board of Education5 2 is derived from what may be styled the "intent" school of interpretivism,
for he relies on the well-documented evidence that "the Framers did
not intend to prohibit segregated public schooling."' 53 But one can
be faithful to the text without being controlled by some contrived
notion of legislative "intent. '5 4 The proper questions in construing
a text focus on the purpose of the provision (the fourteenth amendment in the case of Brown), and whether that purpose would be furthered if applied in the case at bar. 5 5 I take it that the purpose of the
amendment was to prevent blacks (and others) from being placed,
by state action, in a situation that would resemble slavery-a position that would prevent members of those groups from gaining the
opportunity to participate fully in American society. That cannot be
done if segregated public education is permitted-something not
true in 1868 when public education, especially in the South, was in
its infancy. 56 Thus, the description by individual framers of the
51.
52.
53.
point.
54.

See generally Wellington, The
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
M. PERRY, supra note 19, at
See Grano, supra note 12, at
This is a frequent source of

Nature ofJudicial Review, 91 YALE LJ. 486 (1982).

68-69. I am not the first to criticize Perry on this
68.
poor decisions in statutory interpretation cases. See
W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 210-15 (1980).
55. This interpretive method is particularly appropriate with a constitution not
drafted to resolve specific problems, but designed rather to channel and control future
behavior. This is certainly the burden of ChiefJustice Marshall's comment in McCulloch
quoted supra note 3.
56. For a closely related argument, see, e.g., Grano, supra note 12, at 70-72. This
argument, of course, resembles ChiefJustice Warren's often maligned opinion in Brown.
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fourteenth amendment concerning their "intent" towards the impact of the amendment on education may shed light on its purpose,
but it cannot limit the application of the amendment in the completely different world of the mid-twentieth century.
CONCLUSION

Michael Perry has written a provocative and intriguing book.
But his effort to justify judicial review must be called a failure. Indeed, the very strangeness of that attempt illustrates the difficulty of
such a justification. It maybe that members of the Supreme Court
cannot resist the temptation to decide what they believe to be right
regardless of what the Constitution may have to say on the subject.
One who attempts to justify such a process should recognize, however, that increased judicial freedom may end up in the hands of a
Justice whose philosophies may differ markedly from his own. If
there is no belief in law and craft to limit thatJustice, then the advocate of judicial activism must be prepared to accept bad decisions.
Text-based review may restrain judges from doing good; it also restrains them from doing evil.

Although Warren was not overly candid on this point, I believe that the opinion's focus
on the purpose of the fourteenth amendment and the role of education today points the
reader in the correct direction.

By Richard Neely.
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1982

WHY COURTS DON'T WORK.

REVIEWED BY ALAN

D.

HORNSTEIN*

Why Courts Don't Work' is Justice Neely's second book on the
American judicial system and the second I have had the opportunity
to review. This review is a far happier undertaking than the first.2
His previous outing, How Courts Govern America,3 was a brutumfulmen
designed to justify an overtly political-legislative role for the judiciary. Although it shares some of the earlier book's weaknesses of
unsupported assertion and over-generalization, the current work
compensates for them by the perceptiveness with which Justice
Neely examines the operations of our courts in their day-to-day
functioning. The focus of this work is the relatively non-political
mine run of litigation: the landlord-tenant, personal injury, workers' compensation, debtor-creditor, domestic relations cases, rather
than the constitutional fare that was the focus of the first book.4
Neely's judgment of what is wrong with the system is accurate
and his recommendations for improvement are realistic. He recognizes that reform must be politically acceptable, 5 and hence, must
proceed in increments of less than cosmic dimension. 6
Equally important, he understands that reality is almost always
more complicated than the theoretical models scholars build to help
them understand it. There is great danger in the belief that a
change in the model will be reflected in the same change-and only
that change-in the world, that a rule that operates in a particular
way in the vacuum of a model will operate in the same way in the
messiness of the world. Things are connected and interconnected
to each other in ways we often do not dream of. Perhaps the greatest strength of Neely's thought is his recognition of this inherent
complexity.
The major weaknesses of Justice Neely's presentation are those
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland; J.D., 1970, Rutgers Univer-

sity School of Law (Newark).
1. R. NEELY, WHY COURTS DON'T WORK (1983).
2. Hornstein, Book Review, 41 MD. L. REV. 774 (1982).
3. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981).
4. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Id. at 22-23.
6. Id. at 254.
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that marred his earlier attempt. First, he has a marked tendency for
overstatement. The book is intended to give a general audience an
overview of the court system, 7 so that precise qualification of every
assertion may not be as critical as it would be in a more scholary
undertaking. Nonetheless, in communicating his general message,
he simply goes too far, too often.
He claims, for example, that the business of the courts is not
dispute resolution but that "they are really in the business of making
the side in the wrong pay up.''a Legitimate disputes, as opposed to
attempts to avoid real obligations, are, he says, political and concern
what the law should be.9 Undoubtedly there is far too much judicial
time and energy expended simply to compel parties to do what it
was clear they should have done without the intrusion of the judicial
machinery. Of course, there are the deadbeats who simply refuse to
pay legitimate debts hoping the costs of litigtion, financial and
otherwise, will discourage attempts at collection. Similarly, there
are cases in which parties will not comply until resort is had to some
judicial enforcement mechanism, although it is plain at the outset
what the law requires. Where the only consequence of a failure to
act promptly as the law requires is being compelled to act tardily as
the law requires, parties are not likely to rush to conform their conduct to the requirements of law.
Yet there surely are a vast number of cases in which the impetus
litigate
is neither a political attempt to change the law nor a nefato
rious attempt to avoid an obligation. These are legitimate cases in
which there is a good faith dispute about what happened, as a matter of fact, or about how the law should apply to the facts or some
combination of the two. Granted that much of the courts' business
is inconsistent with our theoretical vision of their mission," ° they
sometimes do perform the functions expected of them. Neely's unwillingness to recognize this fact combined with his penchant for
overstatement makes his criticism less credible. This lack of credibility is unfortunate where, as here, his primary point is both accurate and important. The time and resources devoted by courts,
lawyers and their supporting personnel to nondisputes is outrageous. It is probably true, as Neely says, that most actions to evict
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Neely describes this as the myth system, noting that it differs from the opera-

tional system of how courts do, in fact, operate. Id. at 18; R. NEELY, supra note 3, at 1213.
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tenants for nonpayment of rent, to collect store accounts, to recover
for property damage from insurance companies or to collect fines
for traffic violations involve no "real" disputes." Such cases are in
court because they postpone the day of reckoning or because they
exert leverage for settlement: The tenant gets an extra month; the
policyholder accepts less than full value. Yet, by overstating the extent to which this forms the judicial enterprise, Neely risks losing
the confidence of his reader in the truth of this important insight.
The second weakness of Neely's work is a variation of the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, a fallacy that suggests a causal connection between events based upon their temporal sequence. Neely's
variation of this reasoning in Why Courts Don't Work lies in attributing
to a particular class, organization or segment of society the political
responsibility for some state of affairs that operates to its benefit.
Although it is true, as Neely points out, that reform creates winners
and losers, 2 it does not follow that the players are always aware of
the likely effect on them of any particular effort at reform. Where
the ultimate effect of reform is too subtle for the unpracticed eye, it
is often problematic to attribute opposition to self-interest.' 3 Sometimes, of course, the negative effect of reform on some particular
group that opposes the reform is plain and the attribution of motives of self-interest easily justified. The organized bar's opposition
to no-fault automobile insurance is perhaps one illustration.14
On the other hand, the validity of Justice Neely's charge that
New York City's failure to take any substantial step toward alleviating the unconscionable backlog of cases in its court system can be
traced to the large number of cases in which the city is a defendant
is questionable. Granted that delay is in the city's interest,' 5 -it may
cost the city more in judgments if the cases against it are promptly
tried 6 -it is difficult to accept so cynical a connection without some
evidence in addition to the coincidence.
Much of the book is based upon common sense reasoning.
That is both its strength and its weakness. To the extent that the
reader is prepared to accept Neely's perceptions as accurate-as I
am with respect to many of them-the book has much of importance
to say. To the extent that one's common sense perceptions differ
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 168.
See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
See Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 138, 158 (1984).
R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 73.
Id. at 16-17.
"New York City cannot afford an efficient court system." Id. at 17.
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from Neely's, his assertions are of less value because he offers little
hard evidence to support them.
So much for the book's weaknesses. Its strengths lie predominantly in illuminating three problems, two of which are often unrecognized by students of the courts: the problem of visibility and the
problem of unanticipated effects. The third, reconciliation of the
quest for individual justice with the systemic need for general rules,
is one about which volumes have been written. What Neely has to
say about that problem is neither original nor profound.1 7 Nonetheless he is generally right and is likely to inform at least the laity
who are the book's most likely audience.
Neely's discussion of the other two problems, the courts' visibility or lack of visibility and the unanticipated effects ofjudicial action,
is useful for its recognition that the two problems are related. For
example, Neely looks at outrageously high jury awards in personal
injury cases and the attendant publicity. Such awards are often
highly visible. 8 The perception that they are unjustified gives rise
to cries for reform designed to prevent such awards in the future.' 9
17. It is however, as much of Neely's writing is, often amusing. He illustrates the
problem as follows:
I remember once asking a local policeman in a small rural town which of
the town's two restaurants was the better. He [sic] reply was, "Son, they're
both about the same - it doesn't make a bit of difference which one you go to,
but whichever one it is you'll wish to hell you'd gone to the other." The same
conclusion applies to the choice between judicial discretion versus
predictability.
Id. at 94.
18. See, e.g.,Jury Awards $29 Millionfor Child's Misdiagnosis, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 18, 1982, at

2, col. 3 ($29 million awarded in medical malpractice action against physician who misdiagnosed six-month old child as suffering from a common cold when she in fact had
severe cerebral meningitis which led to paralysis and blindness). See also Pike, Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1978, at 50, 53 (reporting that
multi-million dollar jury awards increased from 11 in 1971 to 56 in 1977; examples
include: $128,466,280 awarded in auto gas-tank explosion case; $21,766,000 awarded
the families of four persons killed in the crash of a private plane; $13,355,000 verdict
against building owner and moving company for the rape and murder of a tenant by an
employee of the moving company; $9,341,683 awarded a man who became quadraplegic
as the result of an automobile accident in which the seat belts failed due to allegedly
defective design; $7 million awarded in malpractice case in which a mother was asphyxiated when given nitrous oxide rather than oxygen following childbirth; $7 million
awarded to man who became quadraplegic after striking his head while diving in swimming pool at a hotel). See generally Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and
Rights Consciousness in Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661 (1980) (analyzing the recent

flood of litigation by number of cases, size of individual awards, and use of new causes of
action).
19. See generally Note, Advertising the Economics of High Jury Awards: The Insurance Industry's Bid for ProspectiveJurors to Tighten Their Purse Strings, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175

(1980) (discussing first amendment and right to jury trial issues implicated by the insur-
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Yet such reform may have unanticipated effects. Insurance companies would have far less reason to settle cases if, after causing plaintiffs to invest the time, energy and money necessary to litigate a
be significantly greater
claim, the plaintiffs' recovery is not likely to 20
than would be achieved through settlement.
The threat of inflated awards is one of the factors keeping insurance companies honest. 2 ' Thus, one result of imposing artificial
limitations on personal injury awards is likely to be a reluctance on
the part of at least institutional defendants to negotiate reasonable
settlements of claims. Time is, even now, on the side of the defendant; the plaintiff often needs and almost always prefers the dollar in
hand to the five dollars (discounted by the litigation expenses necessary to obtain it) at the end of a long uncertain road. If the possibility, however remote, of a pot of gold at the end of that road is
eliminated, plaintiffs will take what they are offered and defendants
will not offer much. The injustice of the occasional outrageously
high award is the balance that prevents the injustice of the outrageously low settlement. 2 2 Not a perfect system, surely; but serviceable in the aggregate.2 3
ance industry's attempt to advertise the correlation between high jury awards and inflated insurance premiums). Cf. Newman, Damages: A Call for Meaningful Precedents, 3
PACE L. REV. 605 (1983) (courts that reduce jury awards because they are excessive
should clarify the reasons for remittitur so that attorneys may confidently advise their
clients on the likely amount of recovery).
20. Cf Newman, supra note 19. The author argues that absent the ability to predict
sustainable jury awards, meaningful settlement negotiations may not take place. It is
equally important to note, however, that as the predictable award is reduced by rules
limiting recovery, the pressure on defendants to settle is diminished, and any settlement
offer that is made is likely to be reduced.
21. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 9-10.
22. One of Neely's metaphors is that of the scales ofjustice in balance-not because
each side is without advantage but because the balance of advantage and disadvantage
(the balance of injustices) are relatively equal:
A scale can be in balance when it is empty or when it has two three-hundred
pound weights, one on each side. The scales ofjustice involve a weighted balance rather than an empty balance. The threat of outrageous jury awards in
personal-injury cases balances the delay in getting to trial, and the potential
prodefendant emotional bias of one judge is balanced by the potential
proplaintiff emotional bias of another judge.
Id. at 123. One must be wary, however, lest the system operate in such a way that an
unjust award in a plaintiff's favor in one case is "balanced" by an equally unjust result in
a defendant's favor in another case. Surely this is not the system Neely intends to
recommend.
23. "[Tlhe real measure of a court system is not whether it is capable of providing
perfect justice for everyone but rather whether it provides substantial justice for the
majority of its users." Id. at 210. Cf. Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, 226 NATION 386
(1978); Schwartz, Civil Liberties vs. the ACLU, NEW REPUBLIC, July 26, 1980, at 20, both
reprinted in part in The Mind of a Liberal Law Professor: Selections from the Writings of Louis B.
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Neely's broader discussion of the problem of unanticipated effects rests on a perceptive analysis of the consequences of judicial
and lawyerly myopia, vision that looks at the case at hand and not
that case's relationship to the legal system as a whole. As Neely
points out, judges and lawyers, whether by inclination or by training
and experience, tend to focus on individual cases. 24 By and large
their interests lie with trees rather than forests. From the first day in
law school the object of study is the individual case. And judges, of
course, concern themselves with the adjudication and resolution of
individual cases. Systemic explorations tend to be exceptional.2 5
Yet many of our current difficulties result from viewing a complex
and interrelated world through this prism of the individual case and
making assumptions based upon that view. It is dangerous to attempt to influence the growth and direction of whole forests when
one sees mainly individual trees. 2 6
Neely discusses divorce and child custody proceedings to illustrate the proposition that individual case decisions may effect systemic changes that are unanticipated and perhaps undesirable. For
many years in most jurisdictions, custody of minor children in divorce or separation cases was awarded virtually automatically to the
mother. 27 In the movement toward sexual equality, such awards became the subject of more careful scrutiny. Obviously, in any individual case the father might be a more appropriate guardian than
the mother. The presumption favoring maternal custody began to
Schwartz, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 856-58 (1983) (criticizing the ACLU's opposition to a
criminal reform act because it failed to contain all desired elements of reform).
24. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 114.

25. This should not be overstated. Of course lawyers, judges and scholars are concerned with larger questions of public policy. It is not that these matters are ignored;
rather they are attended largely in the context of individual cases. Thus, the instrumental or policy-based concerns are, in the main, limited to considering the more immediate
and direct consequences of one rule rather than another.
For example, most of the scholarship on the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), is devoted to the question of whether police will be less likely to
violate the fourth amendment under an exclusionary rule regime and, if so, whether the
benefit is worth the price of suppressing probative evidence. Little has been done with
what may be a more far reaching effect of decisions like Mapp-the professionalization
and increased training of law enforcement agencies. But see Batey, Deterring Fourth
Amendment Violations Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 245 (1976)

(suggesting changes in the internal disciplinary procedures of police departments to deter violation of the fourth amendment rights of citizens, and rule making within police
departments to set guidelines for permissible police conduct).
26. Cf. Berger, The Justice Conundrum, 28 VILL. L. REV. 923, 950 (1983) (cautioning

against the expansion ofjudicial authority beyond the limits ofjudicial competence specifically when individual case adjudication could produce far-reaching consequences).
27. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 120.
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give way to an individualized case-by-case determination that appears to be more just to the parties and more advantageous to the
child.
But beyond these individual custody litigations there is another,
less visible level of activity to which the individually litigated cases
are connected. And the results at this level may be significantly less
beneficent than those associated with the results of any particular
adjudicated case. For the resolution of most custody disputes, like
the resolution of most other disputes, is not accomplished in a formal judicial proceeding; rather, it is the result of negotiations
among the parties and their lawyers. 28 The abandonment of the
presumption in favor of maternal custody has one effect in an individually litigated case, and possibly a very different effect on this
other world of negotiated cases. Consequently, a systemic exploration of the problem must take account of the effects of the change in
doctrine at the higher level of visibility on the world less seen.
When parties are engaged in a divorce action, the question of
custody is typically only one factor in a larger universe of disputes
that may also include questions of alimony, child support, division
of assets and so forth. Without a presumption favoring the mother,
the question of custody becomes easier to litigate, and it becomes a
real bargaining chip in divorce negotiations. Thus, a husband attempting to negotiate down alimony demands may threaten a custody fight in order to have a chip to give away. Faced with even the
slightest chance of losing their children, many women will agree to
an unreasonably low financial settlement.2 9 Consequently, the price
we may pay for the elimination of a presumption in favor of maternal custody, a presumption that may work well in the majority of
litigated cases, is a less understood and unseen change in these
more numerous cases determined without resort to formal
processes. This change may be a price worth paying for the greater
individuation of justice in the litigated cases, and inclusion of custody questions in the less formal negotiation process may be beneficial to all parties. But what is important, and what Neely draws our
attention to, is not the desirablility or undesirability of the change,
but the lack of understanding of the ways in which changes in the
highly visible world of formal dispute resolution affect the far more
numerous and far less visible remainder of the iceberg. 0

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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This is not to say that judges ought not strive to do justice in
the individual cases before them. Of course they should. Indeed,
having been lawyers, their habitual focus is on the individual case.
Yet the quest for perfect justice through more and more layers of
elaborate hearings and appeals may have significant unanticipated
systemic effects. 3 ' Inevitably, it makes access more difficult, expensive and time consuming. The problem is insoluble so long as
courts remain institutionally incapable of addressing it, legislatures
remain too politically apathetic to do so, and scholars too concerned
with the more fashionable problems of doctrinal analysis reflected in
lines of precedent to focus upon it.
A key contribution of Neely's work is its extensive observation
about another "hidden" aspect of the judicial system: the lowest
tiers of the formal system, the minor courts. 32 Most citizens who
have any contact with the judicial system do so only at its lowest
levels. It is in the traffic courts, landlord-tenant courts, small claims
courts that most citizens touch the judicial system.33 Yet the law
applied in these courts and the procedures followed there are rarely
the subject of scholarly study and tend to be ignored by the media
and the legislature.3 4 The courts where most of the work is done,
are, according to Neely, straddled with cumbersome rules,
politicized judges and insufficient resources, but the uninteresting
caseloads of the minor courts make the law professionals disinclined
to address the problems of these courts.3 5 Neely's common sense
31. Id. at 114.
32. Id. at 201.
33. Id. at 189-90. Although Neely does not deal with it as such, id. at 127-28, it is
plain that this problem on the criminal side is reflected in the plea bargaining process.
The trial of criminal cases calls forth a substantial body of legal protections designed to
assure a fair and accurate verdict, while safeguarding the rights of the participants. See
generally R. NEELY, supra note 1, ch. 5. Yet all these protections come into play only with
respect to approximately ten percent of criminal cases. The remainder never get to trial;
they are disposed of on negotiated guilty pleas. See generally H. ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT 34 (1982); Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9

& Soc'Y REV. 515 (1975).
What is startling is how few and how feeble are the protections applicable to the
plea bargaining process, certainly when compared with those protections triggered by
the choice to go to trial. Seegenerally Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Tollett
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see
LAw

also McCoy & McMirra, Plea Bargainingas Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV.

887, 898-904 (1980) (discussing these and other plea bargaining protection cases).
Surely there is something wrong with a system in which most of the protections apply to
a small fraction of the cases and a few protections apply to 90% of them.
34. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 194.
35. Id. at 193-97.
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perception, that to those who use the minor courts the problems
resolved by the courts are not minor, s 6 and his wry comment that
the existing system, with its concentration of resources at the middle
and upper levels, is upside down, 7 force the reader to reflect on the
priorities of both the judicial system and the system that educates
the lawyers who perpetuate it. Neely's chief criticism is that lawyers
have little appreciation of the operation of the legal system as a
whole, 8 and to remedy the problems that he observes, such a systemic perception is necessary. Within the legal profession, there is,
of course, an awareness of day-by-day and case-by-case events. Similarly, there is knowledge of the theoretical or doctrinal rules-what
Neely has referred to as the myth systemS-by which the process is
supposed to operate. What is lacking is knowledge of the interactions between these two levels, the cause and effect relationship between the rules and the journalistic events of the legal world.
Law schools and legal scholars, with their focus on doctrinal
analysis, have tended to slight the important systematic study of the
effects of doctrine generally and have ignored almost entirely any
study of those effects in the settings in which they are most likely to
occur-the lawyer's office and the minor courts.4 °
Traditional legal education has been incapable of playing any
significant role in resolving the problems Neely discusses, under a
Langdellian regime that holds not merely that law is a science but,
more important, "that all the available materials of the science are
contained in printed books.'
The first notion-that law is a science-would lead one to expect that empirical study would play a
significant part in the law's development. But the second tenet of
Langdell's model-divorcing doctrine from life-has instead created a system in which law schools' main mission is to train future
lawyers to manipulate verbal symbols, rather than to conduct studies about the effect of the law and then to educate potential lawyers
accordingly.
The failure of the traditional law school classroom to focus on
more than half of the interaction between legal doctrine and individual cases is matched by the failure of clinical legal education with
36. Id. at 195-96.
37. Id. at 201.
38. Id. at 190.
39. See supra note 10.

40. R.
41. A.

NEELY,

supra note 1, at 113-14.

SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).

175 (1967). See generally Grey, Langdell's
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respect to the other half. Moreover, the clinics' failure is in many
ways less excusable.
After a frequently shaky beginning, 42 there has been a marked
improvement in most law school sponsored clinical programs. Increasingly, the operation of the clinic is monitored and supervised
by legal educators rather than practitioners.4 3 Training in the skills
necessary for practice has advanced significantly, and perhaps a
greater appreciation for the role and responsibilities of a professional has been achieved.4 4 An initial overreaction to the perceived
academic formalism of the classroom-a reaction sometimes reaching the point of anti-intellectualism4 5 has been tempered
considerably.
Yet with respect to learning to address, let alone to solve, the
systemic problems Neely raises, the clinics are as inadequate as the
traditional classroom, although for opposite reasons. If the classroom is concerned with law as an abstraction, the clinic's concerns
tend to be with the journalistic details of the law's operation. Like
practice, the clinic tends to focus on the individual cases making up
its docket. Systematic study tends to concern the skills dimension of
legal practice. The operation of doctrine on the world beyond the
clinic's individual cases is little attended. For example a student
repesenting a woman in a domestic relations dispute may see the
effects of a change in doctrine making custody a more litigable issue,
without appreciating that it is that change in doctrine that is the
cause. 46 The student in the clinic is more likely than most to be able
to observe the inadequacies of the bottom tier of our judicial system. The majority of cases on clinics' dockets are landlord-tenant
cases, criminal misdemeanor cases, government benefit cases and so
42. Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277,
278. For a discussion of the purposes behind the establishment of clinical programs, see
Berryhill, Clinical Education-A Golden Dancer?, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 69, 71-74 (1978).
43. Leleiko, Clinical Education, Empirical Study, and Legal Scholarship, 30J. LEGAL EDUC.
149, 159 (1979). See Hoffman, supra note 42, at 283-310, for a discussion of different
methods for teaching practical skills within a clinical setting. See also Meltsner & Schrag,
Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978) (describing the clinical experience at
Columbia University).
44. See Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 604 (1983), and responsive comments including Bellow, On Talking Tough
to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 619 (1983); Luban, Epistemology and
Moral Education, 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 636 (1983); Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33J. Legal
Educ. 624 (1983); Redlich, The Moral Value of ClinicalLegal Education: A Reply, 33J. LEGAL
EDUC. 613 (1983).
45. See Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Education, 28 MERCER L.
REV. 447 (1977).
46. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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forth. Here again, however, experience with and observation of
these cases is likely to be impressionistic, with little or no attempt to
generalize or theorize in any systematic way about the flaws in the
process.4 7 Yet a systemic view of the problems in the minor courts
is necessary to rectify the problems Neely discusses.
All of this is not to say that clinical education is doing less than
it was designed to do; or even less than what it is suited to do.
Equally, I do not mean to suggest that traditional legal education
does not do well what is suitable for the classroom and the
casebook. But the law school as a whole-the classroom and clinic
together-has surely missed a very important opportunity. It is the
lack of integration between theory and practice, doctrine and its application to real cases, that has been missing. And that deficiency
has enormous consequences for the problems with which Justice
Neely's book is concerned.
At the heart of these problems is a model of the legal system as
an iceberg. The visible features of the mass is the doctrine, the rules
expounded and promulgated by legislatures and (mostly) by courts
of last resort. The public is aware of that part of the iceberg, if it is
aware of any aspect of the legal system. It is that part of the iceberg
which is examined, studied, analyzed in the nation's law schools. Indeed, even with respect to the pure problems of court administration, the concerns most publicized are the caseload problems of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 48 problems whose solution is
unlikely to have a significant effect on the problems in the lower
courts.
What is important about this model as it relates to the modern
American law school is that the focus of the traditional classroom is
largely on the tip of the iceberg, while the typical law school clinic
focuses on only fragmented bits and pieces of the great mass below
the surface. The gap is that each study operates largely independently of the other. Attempts to bring the clinic into the so-called
mainstream of the university law school, attempts, that is, to integrate rather than merely attach the clinic to the academy, are still
47. But cf. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of
Social Security's Medical-Vocational Guidelines-Two Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-Holing
Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329 (1983) (discussion of the disability determination process, guidelines, accuracy, and standards).
48. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1973); G. CASPER &
R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976). See also Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 442 (1983) (noting that in 1953 "the
Court had 1,463 cases on its docket and issued 65 signed Court opinions . . . [and in
1982] the Court had 5,311 cases on its docket and issued 141 signed Court opinions").
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relatively controversial.4 9 And those attempts that have been made
are directed toward integrating the pedagogical contributions that
each component can bring to the educational mission of the institution. There is a virtual absence of any other form of integration
between these two units of the university law school. This absence
of scholarly (as apart from pedagogical) integration may be a major
obstacle to solving at least some of the problems raised by Justice
Neely.
Neely persuasively argues that the major components of any solution to the problem of courts that don't work are political forces
committed to making them work,50 and knowledge of both the reasons for their failure and the conditions necessary to remedy the
problems. 5 ' The university law school in its dual role of training
new actors in the system and researching the legal world, is uniquely
situated to contribute at least part of a solution. A coming together
of the clinic and classroom for purposes of scholarly research would
permit a systematic study of the operation of doctrine in reality, at
least in those areas of the law in which the particular clinic operates.5 2 Such study is unlikely to take place within the clinic alone
because of the pressures of day-to-day operations. Similarly, the
academy lacks easy access to the data generated by clinic activity.
But together, each could have a substantial role to play in organizing, evaluating, and theorizing about solutions to the problems
Neely highlights.
If Langdell was right in believing that law is a science, he was
surely wrong in his implication that it is a pure or theoretical science. It is, if science at all, an empirical or applied science. Its
materials are not to be found exclusively in the library but also in
the laboratory. The law school clinic provides an accessible laboratory for the systematic study of law in the real world.
If our courts are to be better than they are, if our law is to be
better than it is, political power must, as Neely says, be harnessed to
49. See, e.g., Redlich, Clinical Education: Stranger in an Elitist Club, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
201 (1981).
50. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 29-30.
51. Id. at 240, 254.
52. There are, I believe, additional though heretofore neglected benefits to such an
arrangement. The availability of traditional faculty, so-called, to serve in an "Of Counsel" capacity to the clinic could provide significant advantages to both. There is a rich
vein of expertise to be found on the academic side of the law school that should provide
an obvious resource to the clinical side. At the same time, periodic exposure to clinical
practice might serve to keep the academician more in touch with the professional world
beyond her classroom.
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that end. That power, however, to be effective must be informed.
Surely it is the responsibility of the legal profession to provide the
knowledge necessary to effective attempts at improvement. And if
that responsibility falls to the legal profession, awareness must begin with those of us in the law schools. We are appropriately positioned both in terms of available resources and responsibility to
begin to study "why courts don't work." Justice Neely has provided
an important and perceptive beginning; it is properly our task to
take up the work.

